

STRENGTHENING ANTI-CORRUPTION FORENSIC CAPACITY IN UKRAINE'S CBRN SECURITY SECTOR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE JAPAN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCY (JICA) KNOWLEDGE CO-CREATION PROGRAM

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ABSTRACT. Corruption within a nation's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) security sector represents a critical threat to both national and international stability. In Ukraine, this threat is amplified by the compounded challenges of an ongoing war of national defense, the prospective demands of post-conflict reconstruction, and the persistent need for deep-seated anti-corruption reforms. This article examines the potential of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Knowledge Co-Creation Program (KCCP) in anti-corruption forensics as a targeted intervention to enhance Ukraine's institutional capacity in this highly sensitive domain. Through a qualitative case study methodology, this analysis first maps the specific corruption risks and forensic capacity gaps prevalent in Ukraine's CBRN sector, including vulnerabilities in procurement, illicit financial flows, and methodological deficiencies in complex investigations. It then assesses the alignment of the JICA KCCP curriculum, which emphasizes advanced digital and financial forensics, inter-agency coordination, and international best practices. The article argues that while the JICA program offers vital technical skills that are well-matched to Ukraine's identified needs, its long-term success and transformative impact are contingent upon Ukraine's ability to navigate the complex political economy of reform and ensure sustained institutional buy-in. Drawing on theories of post-conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR), the analysis concludes that the absorption of technical expertise must be supported by continued political will to strengthen the independence of the entire anti-corruption ecosystem. The success of this specialized partnership could serve as a model for future international cooperation in high-stakes security environments.

Keywords: Anti-corruption, Forensic Science, CBRN Security, Ukraine, JICA, International Cooperation, Security Sector Reform, Post-Conflict Reconstruction

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Nexus of Corruption and CBRN Security: A Global Threat

The security of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials and facilities constitutes a cornerstone of the international security architecture. The misuse of these materials, whether through state-sponsored programs or by non-state actors, poses

an existential threat to global stability (United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, n.d.). While technical safeguards and physical security are paramount, a growing body of evidence indicates that governance failures, particularly corruption, are a primary enabling factor for CBRN proliferation and terrorism (Bunn, 2009). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, n.d.-b) identifies the risk of CBRN materials being used by non-state actors for terrorist purposes as one of the gravest contemporary concerns.

Corruption acts as a critical vulnerability within the security apparatus designed to protect these materials. It can manifest in various forms, each capable of compromising the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. These include the bribery of officials to bypass export controls, the corrupt procurement of dual-use technologies, and the complicity of insiders in the theft or diversion of sensitive materials (Bunn, 2009). Such acts undermine the foundational international legal instruments, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which rely on robust state-level implementation and verification (UNODC, n.d.-b; United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, n.d.). The nexus of corruption and CBRN security thus transforms a governance problem into a direct threat to international peace, demanding integrated solutions that address both technical deficiencies and the human factors that exploit them (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, 2018).

1.2. Ukraine's Compounded Challenge: War, Reconstruction, and Endemic Corruption

Ukraine presents a uniquely critical case study for examining the intersection of corruption and CBRN security. The nation is simultaneously confronting a full-scale war of national survival, the monumental task of future reconstruction, and a legacy of systemic corruption that it has been working to dismantle since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity (Kos, 2022; Chatham House, 2018). This „double challenge“ creates a security environment of unprecedented complexity. The ongoing conflict has not only heightened the physical risks to Ukraine's extensive CBRN infrastructure—including numerous nuclear power plants, industrial chemical facilities, and biological research laboratories—but has also introduced new corruption vulnerabilities. Wartime exigencies have, at times, necessitated a reduction in transparency, particularly in defense and security-related procurement, creating opportunities for malfeasance that could have catastrophic consequences (Kalitenko, 2023).

In this context, corruption within the CBRN sector is not merely a drain on state resources or a barrier to development; it is an acute national security threat that could be exploited by an adversary. A security system weakened by graft at a critical facility could facilitate sabotage, theft of materials for a false-flag operation, or illicit trafficking (Bunn, 2009). Consequently, strengthening Ukraine's anti-corruption framework is a strategic imperative for its own resilience and for global security. This imperative is recognized by Ukraine's international partners, who have made continued progress in anti-corruption a cornerstone of financial and military assistance and a prerequisite for European Union accession (Wilson Center, 2024; Kalitenko, 2023). Despite significant reforms and measurable progress noted by organizations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), substantial challenges remain, particularly in ensuring the effective investigation and

prosecution of complex corruption offenses (OECD, 2025; National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 2025).

1.3. Research Question and Thesis Statement

This article addresses the following research questions: (1) What are the primary corruption-related vulnerabilities and forensic capacity gaps within Ukraine's CBRN security sector? (2) To what extent can the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Knowledge Co-Creation Program (KCCP) on anti-corruption forensics address these specific gaps? (3) What are the broader political and institutional challenges to the effective absorption and implementation of such a targeted technical assistance program in Ukraine's post-conflict context?

This article argues that while the Japan International Cooperation Agency's Knowledge Co-Creation Program offers a technically robust and highly relevant solution to Ukraine's identified deficiencies in anti-corruption forensic capacity, its ultimate impact on CBRN security will be determined less by the quality of the training itself and more by the ability of Ukrainian institutions to overcome systemic political-economic barriers to reform, a critical challenge highlighted by theories of post-conflict security sector reform.

1.4. Structure of the Article

The subsequent sections of this article are organized to develop this thesis systematically. Section 2 outlines the conceptual framework, drawing on theories of anti-corruption capacity building and post-conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR), and details the qualitative case study methodology. Section 3 presents the results of the analysis, mapping Ukraine's CBRN corruption risks, identifying its forensic capacity gaps, and describing the JICA program as a proposed intervention. Section 4 provides a discussion of these findings, analyzing the prospects and challenges of integrating Japanese expertise within the Ukrainian context. Finally, Section 5 offers a conclusion and a set of policy recommendations for Ukrainian and international stakeholders.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

2.1. A Framework for Analyzing Anti-Corruption Capacity Building

Evaluating the potential efficacy of an international assistance program requires a framework that moves beyond a simplistic input-output model where training is assumed to lead directly to improved outcomes. This study adopts a multi-level framework for assessing capacity building, examining its potential impact at the individual, organizational, and systemic levels.

- **Individual Level:** This concerns the enhancement of skills, knowledge, and competencies of the forensic experts, investigators, and prosecutors participating in the program.
- **Organizational Level:** This level assesses the extent to which new methodologies, technologies, and standard operating procedures are adopted and institutionalized within

the participants' home organizations, such as the Ministry of Justice, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), or the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO).

- **Systemic Level:** This encompasses the broader enabling environment, including the effectiveness of inter-agency coordination, the integrity of the judicial system, and the overarching political and legal climate that either supports or obstructs the application of newly acquired capacities.

This framework is informed by critical literature on the effectiveness of international anti-corruption assistance, which consistently highlights the limitations of purely technocratic solutions that fail to account for the political economy of the recipient state. Such interventions often falter when they encounter entrenched interests that benefit from the status quo. Direct anti-corruption measures, such as the establishment of specialized commissions, rarely succeed without sustained support from political elites and the judiciary (Fjeldstad & Isaksen, 2008). Therefore, any analysis of the JICA program must consider not only the technical skills it imparts but also the political and institutional context into which those skills will be deployed.

2.2. Integrating Theories of Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Given that Ukraine is a nation at war with a clear post-conflict reconstruction horizon, this article explicitly situates the analysis within the theoretical framework of Security Sector Reform (SSR). SSR literature provides essential concepts for understanding the complexities of transforming security institutions in fragile and conflict-affected states. Key tenets of SSR include the inextricable link between security and development, the imperative of democratic governance and oversight of security actors, and the persistent challenge of ensuring local ownership of reforms in the face of significant donor influence (GSDRC, n.d.).

Applying an SSR lens is crucial because it frames the JICA program not as a standalone training course but as a micro-level external intervention within a national security sector undergoing a profound, high-stakes transformation (Ehrhart, 2009). This perspective compels an analysis of critical factors such as the sustainability of reforms, the capacity of Ukrainian institutions to absorb and adapt new knowledge, and the political will to implement changes that may challenge powerful vested interests. The challenges inherent in post-conflict SSR—including a collapsed state infrastructure, the dominance of military over civilian priorities, and the need to restructure before electoral legitimization—provide a realistic prism through which to assess the potential long-term impact of the JICA initiative. This framework allows for a predictive analysis of the likely obstacles the program will face, moving beyond its curriculum to the systemic conditions required for its success.

2.3. Case Study Approach: Analyzing the Ukrainian Context and the JICA Intervention

The methodology employed is a qualitative, single-case study. The „case” is the proposed application of the JICA KCCP to address the problem of CBRN-related corruption in Ukraine. This approach is well-suited for an in-depth, context-rich examination of a complex phenomenon. The analysis relies on a triangulation of diverse data sources, including

the foundational Ukrainian-language document proposing the collaboration, official JICA program descriptions and curricula (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2021, 2024a, 2024b, 2025), peer-reviewed academic literature on corruption and SSR, and policy reports from international organizations such as the OECD and UNODC (OECD, 2025; National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 2025; UNODC, n.d.-b). The analytical process involves two main stages: first, a descriptive mapping of the problem domain (the risks, capacity gaps, and the proposed intervention) presented in the Results section; and second, a critical evaluation of the intervention's potential, using the conceptual frameworks of capacity building and SSR, presented in the Discussion section.

3. RESULTS: ASSESSING CORRUPTION RISKS AND CAPACITY GAPS IN UKRAINE'S CBRN SECTOR

This section presents the empirical findings derived from the source materials, systematically outlining the corruption risks specific to Ukraine's CBRN sector, the corresponding deficiencies in its forensic capabilities, and the key features of the JICA program designed as a remedial intervention.

3.1. Mapping the Landscape of CBRN Corruption Risks in Ukraine

The strategic importance and high capital value of CBRN sector projects make them particularly susceptible to corruption. In the Ukrainian context, these risks are acute and multifaceted.

3.1.1. Vulnerabilities in Procurement and Contract Management

A significant portion of projects in the CBRN sphere, such as the procurement of advanced laboratory equipment, the disposal of legacy chemical weapons, or the construction and maintenance of storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, are financed through state budgets or international assistance programs. This creates substantial opportunities for corruption, including:

- **Inflation of Contract Costs:** Deliberately overstating the value of goods and services to siphon off public funds .
- **Use of Fictitious or Affiliated Companies:** Awarding contracts to shell companies or entities secretly linked to public officials, ensuring that competitive bidding processes are subverted .
- **Violation of International Safety Standards:** Cutting corners on safety and quality standards to reduce costs and increase illicit profits, thereby creating severe risks of radiation accidents or the leakage of hazardous materials .

These practices are consistent with recognized global patterns of corruption in the defense and security sector, which is often characterized by large, complex, and sometimes secretive budgets that are difficult to oversee. The consequences of such corruption in the CBRN sector extend beyond financial loss, directly threatening public safety and environmental stability.

3.1.2. The Threat of Terrorism Financing and Illicit Financial Flows

Corruption schemes in high-value sectors are frequently intertwined with money

laundering and other illicit financial flows. In the context of CBRN security, this nexus presents a particularly grave threat. Illicit funds generated through corrupt contracts could be channeled to finance terrorist organizations. This creates the perilous scenario where the proceeds of corruption are used to fund attacks against the very CBRN infrastructure from which they were derived.

This aligns with the understanding of international bodies like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which note that money laundering (ML) and the financing of terrorism (TF) often exploit the same vulnerabilities in financial systems that permit anonymity and opacity in transactions (International Monetary Fund, 2025; Financial Action Task Force, 2008). Effective Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) requires robust financial investigation capabilities to „follow the money,” identify support networks, and disrupt their operations—a capacity that is central to preventing CBRN terrorism (UNODC, n.d.-a; U.S. Department of the Treasury, n.d.).

3.2. Deficiencies in Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Forensic Ecosystem

Despite significant progress in establishing a national anti-corruption infrastructure since 2014, Ukraine’s forensic ecosystem faces specific challenges that limit its effectiveness in tackling complex crimes in specialized sectors like CBRN security.

3.2.1. Legal and Methodological Gaps

A primary deficiency is the limited application of modern, integrated forensic methodologies. While Ukraine possesses specialists in technical fields like chemical or radiological analysis, there is a lack of comprehensive methods registered for official use that allow investigators to simultaneously assess the technical, financial, and digital aspects of a single criminal scheme. This methodological gap results in fragmented investigations, where technical experts provide narrow conclusions on physical evidence while the broader financial crime remains underexplored. Furthermore, forensic findings often face challenges in court, either for failing to meet international evidentiary standards or for lacking sufficient legal force, which complicates the process of securing convictions against high-level officials.

3.2.2. Organizational and Technological Challenges

The institutional landscape for anti-corruption is marked by organizational fragmentation. The Ministry of Justice, which oversees forensic institutions, along with specialized anti-corruption bodies (NABU, SAPO), law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary, often operate in parallel without sufficient coordination or systematic data exchange. This leads to duplication of effort, delays in investigations, and a reduced capacity to detect and dismantle sophisticated criminal networks.

Compounding this is a deficit in specialized human capital. There is a shortage of experts who possess the interdisciplinary skills required to work at the intersection of criminalistics, financial monitoring, digital forensics, and CBRN security. This is exacerbated by a significant technological lag. While advanced economies increasingly use artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and big data analytics to detect anomalies in financial transactions and procurement data, the application of these tools in Ukrainian forensic practice remains

limited and ad hoc. This technological gap means that opportunities to identify hidden links between corrupt actors, trace complex international transactions, and flag suspicious procurement of dual-use materials are often missed.

3.3. The JICA Knowledge Co-Creation Program: A Proposed Intervention

The JICA KCCP, specifically the course titled „Improve Capacity for Anti-corruption Forensic Expertise,” is presented as a targeted intervention to address these deficiencies. The program is designed for senior officials from Ukraine’s Ministry of Justice, NABU, SAPO, and the High Anti-Corruption Court.

3.3.1. Curriculum and Focus

The JICA program is built on a philosophy of „co-creation,” emphasizing mutual learning and partnership rather than unilateral instruction (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2024b, 2025). Its curriculum is comprehensive, combining theoretical lectures, practical exercises, and site visits to relevant Japanese institutions. Key modules and areas of focus include:

- **Advanced Investigative Techniques:** Training in digital forensics, financial investigation, asset tracing and recovery, and the use of biometric data (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2025).
- **Modern Technologies:** Exploration of innovative tools, including the application of AI in forensic investigations to detect complex corruption schemes.
- **Legal and Institutional Frameworks:** Study of Japan’s anti-corruption legislation and the operational practices of its criminal justice institutions (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2021).
- **International Cooperation:** Emphasis on building a global network of practitioners and understanding mechanisms for international cooperation in transnational corruption cases, in line with the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2021, 2024b).

3.3.2. The Japanese Model: Legal Frameworks and Technological Prowess

The expertise offered through the JICA program is grounded in Japan’s own well-developed anti-corruption and forensic ecosystem. Japan’s legal framework is robust, with the Penal Code addressing domestic bribery and the Unfair Competition Prevention Act (UCPA) criminalizing the bribery of foreign public officials (Norton Rose Fulbright, n.d.; Anderson Mori & Tomotsune, 2023; GAN Integrity, 2018). The country consistently ranks low on indices of perceived corruption, reflecting a high degree of public integrity in its institutions, although challenges such as the traditional practice of *amakudari* (assigning retired officials to corporate positions) persist (GAN Integrity, 2018).

Japan’s technological prowess in digital and financial forensics is a key asset. The country has a mature market for digital forensic services, driven by both law enforcement needs and corporate fraud investigations (Intellect Markets, 2024; PwC Japan, n.d.). High-profile cases, such as the investigation into the \$1.7 billion Olympus accounting fraud scandal, demonstrated the advanced capabilities of Japanese authorities and forensic experts in

unraveling complex financial concealment schemes, known as tobashi (Elam et al., 2016). This deep reservoir of practical experience and technological sophistication forms the basis of the knowledge transfer offered through the JICA program.

4. DISCUSSION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR INTEGRATING JAPANESE EXPERTISE

While the JICA KCCP appears technically well-suited to address Ukraine's forensic capacity gaps, its potential for transformative impact must be analyzed through the critical lenses of SSR and the political economy of reform. This section evaluates the alignment between the program's offerings and Ukraine's needs, explores the systemic barriers to knowledge transfer, and discusses the broader strategic implications of this partnership.

4.1. Bridging the Gap: Aligning JICA's Offerings with Ukraine's Needs

There is a strong *prima facie* alignment between the deficiencies identified in Ukraine's anti-corruption forensic ecosystem and the core components of the JICA KCCP curriculum. The program's focus on integrating digital and financial forensic techniques directly targets the methodological fragmentation that currently hampers complex investigations in Ukraine. Similarly, its inclusion of modules on AI and modern investigative tools addresses the acknowledged technological gap. The emphasis on international cooperation and network-building offers a potential remedy for organizational silos and provides a pathway for harmonizing Ukrainian practices with global standards. This direct mapping, summarized in Table 1, demonstrates that the JICA program is not a generic capacity-building exercise but a highly tailored intervention with the potential to deliver specific, relevant skills.

Table 1: Mapping Ukraine's Forensic Capacity Gaps to JICA KCCP Curriculum Components

Identified Gap in Ukraine	Relevant JICA KCCP Component
Lack of integrated methodologies combining technical and financial analysis.	Comprehensive curriculum including digital forensics, financial investigation, and asset recovery techniques (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2025).
Underutilization of modern technologies (AI, big data).	Specific focus on leveraging investigative techniques like digital forensics and discussions on AI in investigations
Fragmented inter-agency coordination.	Emphasis on international cooperation frameworks and building a global network of practitioners (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2021, 2024b).
Deficit of specialized human capital.	Core objective of human resource development through intensive, experience-based training (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2024a).

Identified Gap in Ukraine	Relevant JICA KCCP Component
Forensic conclusions not meeting international standards.	Exposure to Japanese and international best practices, legal frameworks, and standards (e.g., UNCAC) (Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2021, 2024b).

Source: created by the author.

The value of this alignment is that it provides a clear pathway for addressing tangible operational weaknesses. By equipping a cohort of Ukrainian experts with these advanced skills, the program can create nodes of excellence within the country's anti-corruption institutions, potentially catalyzing broader methodological and technological upgrades.

4.2. The Political Economy of Reform: Overcoming Barriers to Knowledge Transfer

The most significant challenges to the program's success are not technical but political and institutional. The SSR framework cautions that in post-conflict or high-stress environments, technical capacity building alone is insufficient to guarantee reform (Fjeldstad & Isaksen, 2008). The effective application of advanced forensic skills depends on a supportive enabling environment that is often absent. Several critical questions arise: Will newly trained experts receive the political backing and legal protection necessary to investigate powerful, politically connected individuals who may be involved in CBRN-sector corruption? Will the Ukrainian judiciary, which is itself undergoing a difficult and contested reform process and has been identified by the OECD as an area needing improvement, be capable of impartially adjudicating cases built on complex digital and financial evidence? (Wilson Center, 2024; National Agency on Corruption Prevention, 2025).

The history of international anti-corruption assistance is replete with examples of well-designed programs that failed to achieve lasting impact due to a lack of genuine political will from host-country elites (Fjeldstad & Isaksen, 2008). There is a risk of creating a „veneer of reform,” where a small number of experts are trained to international standards, but their skills are marginalized or their investigations are stymied by systemic obstacles. However, a potential mitigating factor may be JICA's distinct approach. The agency's philosophy of „co-creation” and its focus on „human security”—protecting individuals and empowering communities—promotes a partnership model that could foster deeper, more sustainable local ownership compared to more prescriptive, top-down assistance programs (Japan International Cooperation Agency, n.d.; Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2023). The success of this model in the Ukrainian context will depend on whether this collaborative spirit can translate into genuine institutional commitment across the anti-corruption vertical.

4.3. Broader Implications for National Security and International Trust

The strategic stakes of this program extend far beyond the realm of forensic science. If successfully integrated, the enhanced capacity could create a powerful deterrent effect, fundamentally altering the risk-reward calculation for corrupt actors in the CBRN sector. By

increasing the probability of detection and successful prosecution, it would directly address the vulnerabilities that threaten national security (Bunn, 2009). A single, high-profile conviction in a major CBRN procurement case, secured through the use of advanced forensic methods, would send an unequivocal message that impunity is no longer guaranteed (Lyle et al., 2022).

This can initiate a positive feedback loop with significant strategic benefits. Tangible successes in combating corruption, especially in a sector as critical as CBRN, serve as powerful signals to Ukraine's international partners. They build confidence that financial and military aid is being used effectively and responsibly, which is crucial for sustaining support during a protracted conflict and for attracting investment for post-war reconstruction (Wilson Center, 2024; OECD, 2025). Furthermore, demonstrating progress in implementing robust anti-corruption measures is a key benchmark in Ukraine's path toward EU integration (Wilson Center, 2024). Therefore, a relatively small-scale technical assistance program like the JICA KCCP has the potential to yield disproportionate strategic returns by serving as a „proof of concept“ for Ukraine's commitment to deep and meaningful reform, strengthening both its internal resilience and its international legitimacy.

4.4. Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

This analysis is inherently prospective, evaluating a planned program based on its design and the context of its implementation. As such, its primary limitation is that the actual impact of the JICA KCCP remains to be empirically verified. The complex and dynamic nature of Ukraine's wartime environment means that unforeseen challenges and opportunities will undoubtedly arise.

This limitation points toward clear avenues for future research. A longitudinal study that tracks the careers of the Ukrainian participants upon their return would be invaluable. Such research could assess the extent to which they are able to apply their new skills, the challenges they face within their organizations, and their influence on institutional practices. Further research could also involve a comparative analysis of conviction rates and the complexity of evidence presented in CBRN-related corruption cases before and after the intervention. Finally, an ex-post evaluation of the program would offer critical lessons for the design and implementation of future specialized, high-impact capacity-building initiatives in other conflict-affected and post-conflict states.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Synthesizing the Findings

Corruption in the CBRN sector poses a clear and present danger to Ukraine's national security and to the international non-proliferation regime. The confluence of war, the demands of future reconstruction, and the strategic importance of Ukraine's CBRN infrastructure creates an urgent and compelling need to enhance the state's anti-corruption forensic capacity. This analysis finds that the Japan International Cooperation Agency's Knowledge Co-Creation Program is, by design, exceptionally well-matched to address Ukraine's specific, identified technical and methodological gaps in digital and financial forensics.

However, the central argument of this article is that the ultimate success of this intervention will hinge less on the technical quality of the training and more on the political and institutional environment into which the newly acquired expertise is deployed. The primary obstacles are not technical but systemic. Drawing from the lessons of Security Sector Reform in post-conflict contexts, the effective use of advanced forensic evidence requires an unbroken „accountability chain”—from independent investigation and prosecution to impartial judicial review. Strengthening any single link in this chain, while beneficial, is insufficient if other links remain weak. Therefore, the JICA program should be viewed not as a panacea, but as a critical component of a much broader, sustained effort to build a resilient and independent anti-corruption ecosystem in Ukraine.

5.2. Policy Recommendations for Ukrainian Stakeholders

To maximize the impact of the JICA KCCP and similar international partnerships, Ukrainian stakeholders should adopt a strategic and holistic approach:

- For the Ministry of Justice and Anti-Corruption Bodies (NABU, SAPO, HACC): The JICA program should be treated as a catalyst for institutional change, not merely as an individual training opportunity. A clear strategy must be developed to institutionalize the knowledge gained. This should include updating the official register of forensic methodologies to incorporate integrated financial-digital approaches, establishing permanent inter-agency working groups on CBRN-related financial crime, and implementing a „train the trainer” model to ensure the knowledge cascades throughout the relevant institutions, creating a critical mass of skilled practitioners.
- For the Government of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada: It is imperative to recognize that technical capacity is rendered inert without corresponding political will. Efforts must continue to safeguard and strengthen the institutional independence and operational capacity of NABU, SAPO, and the HACC. Concurrently, accelerating judicial reform is essential to ensure that courts are equipped and willing to handle complex cases built on sophisticated forensic evidence, thereby creating an environment where such evidence can lead to meaningful legal consequences.
- For Ukraine’s International Partners: Support for Ukraine’s anti-corruption efforts should be comprehensive and synergistic. Specialized technical assistance programs like JICA’s KCCP should be complemented by continued high-level political engagement, financial support, and principled conditionality that reinforces the independence of the entire anti-corruption ecosystem. Partners should coordinate to ensure that support for forensic capacity is matched by support for judicial integrity, whistleblower protection, and civil society oversight.

5.3. Concluding Remarks on the Role of International Partnerships

The partnership between JICA and Ukraine in the realm of anti-corruption forensics represents a promising model for future international cooperation. It is highly specialized, demand-driven, and founded on a principle of mutual learning and co-creation. The outcomes of this initiative—both its successes and its challenges—will offer invaluable

lessons for designing and implementing effective SSR and anti-corruption interventions in other fragile and post-conflict states. If successful, it will demonstrate that targeted, expert-level knowledge transfer, when embedded within a broader strategy of institutional reform and sustained political will, can make a decisive contribution to strengthening national security and fostering a rules-based international order.

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